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Abstract 
The year 2014 has witnessed the escalation of the 
largest ever Ebola outbreak which started in Guinea, and 
later spread to other countries in West Africa. The 
associated disease burden has already exceeded the total 
number of cases in all the sporadic outbreaks that 
occurred since the first description of Ebola in 1976. The 
threat of further spread across Africa, and possibly 
beyond through international travel, is of concern and 
has led several countries around the world to implement 
preparedness measures against Ebola. In an attempt to 
contain the spread of Ebola, WHO and other non-
governmental humanitarian organisations have pooled 
their resources to fuel efforts at improving patient care, 
isolation facilities, healthcare worker training, and 
availability of personal protective equipment in the 
affected countries. The outbreak has brought to light the 
lack of past investment in research into treatment or 
potential vaccine development against the Ebola virus, 
with the only hope of expediting a cure that can be used 
in the current outbreak being through the launch of 
clinical trials investigating experimental drugs in the 
affected countries. 
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Introduction 
The Ebola virus (EBOV) is one of the aetiologies of 
Viral Haemorrhagic Fever (VHF), a syndrome complex 
characterised by fever, capillary leak, bleeding and 
shock. This zoonotic RNA virus was first discovered in 
1976, following the first documented outbreak near the 
Ebola River in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of 
Congo) which occurred simultaneously with another 
outbreak in Sudan.1 Several outbreaks have occurred 
since its discovery, almost all of which have occurred in 
sub-Saharan Africa.2 The current ongoing outbreak in 
West Africa is the largest ever to be reported and the 
associated high mortality as well as its potential for 
international spread are a real concern. The statement on 
the Ebola virus disease (EVD) released on the 31st of 
July, 2014 by Margaret Chan, the Director General of 
the World Health Organization (WHO): “If the situation 
continues to deteriorate, the consequences can be 
catastrophic in terms of lost lives but also severe 
socioeconomic disruption and increased risk of spread to 
other countries”3 has led several countries to implement 
public health preparedness measures to immediately 
contain imported cases of EVD. 
 
Ebola virus 
The most likely vector of the EBOV is the fruit bat, 
specifically Hypsignathus monstrosus (the hammer-
headed fruit bat), Epomops franqueti (Franquet’s 
epaulettes fruit bat), and Myonycteris torquata (the little-
collared bat).4 The means of transmission within bat 
populations remains unknown.5 Little is known of the 
life cycle of the EBOV, and why it only appears during 
intermittent outbreaks. Human disease is thought to 
result from consumption of poorly-cooked infected 
animals, such as bats or chimpanzees (which are known 
to feed on bats).4, 6 However unlike other zoonoses Ebola 
has the potential of spreading from human to human 
from exposure of mucous membranes or broken skin to 
infected body fluids including large aerosol droplets that 
can be produced during coughing. There are 5 known 
strains of the EBOV as described in table 1.7 
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Table 1: The 5 known strains of the Ebola virus7 
Strain Acronym Description 
Bundibugyo BDBV First discovered in 2007 
during an outbreak in 
Uganda 
Zaire EBOV Causative strain in the 
current outbreak. 
Commonest cause of 
human disease 
Reston RESTV Cause of outbreaks in 
monkeys and pigs. Not 
known to cause clinically 
apparent human illness or 
death 
Sudan SUDV Associated with large 
outbreaks, mostly centred in 
Sudan and Uganda 
Taï Forest TAFV Emerged in Taï Forest, 
Ivory Coast in 1994, 
causing infection in a single 
individual 
 
Clinical manifestations 
EVD is a severe acute viral illness characterised by 
the sudden onset of fever, intense weakness, muscle 
pain, headache and sore throat followed by vomiting, 
diarrhoea, rash and impaired renal and liver function. 
Disease progression may lead to disseminated 
intravascular coagulation, causing the characteristic 
terminal haemorrhagic phase that manifests as internal 
and external bleeding7 including epistaxis, 
haematemesis, melaena, petechiae, ecchymosis and 
bleeding at venepuncture sites.8 These signs are manifest 
in around 50% of patients.9 The incubation period is 
estimated to be between 2 and 21 days, with patients 
remaining infectious as long as their blood and 
secretions (including semen) contain the virus, which 
can persist in semen for up to 61 days after the onset of 
illness.7 Patients do not transmit Ebola during the 
incubation period but become infectious once they 
develop clinical features of EVD.7 A diagnosis of EVD 
can be confirmed by means of several laboratory 
methods such as  an antibody-capture enzyme-linked 
immunosorbent assay, antigen detection tests, a serum 
neutralisation test, reverse transcriptase polymerase 
chain reaction (RT-PCR) assay, electron microscopy, or 
virus isolation by cell culture.7 During the current 
outbreak, RT-PCR kits have proven the most useful, 
accurate, and popular diagnostic investigation.7 
 
 
 
Ebola outbreaks  
Since the first outbreak in 1976, several Ebola 
outbreaks have been reported in humans and livestock 
within Africa over the last four decades (Table 2). The 
only unrelated handful of isolated cases occurring in 
Europe, Russia and the USA were in research laboratory 
workers. The Ebola subtype which is responsible for the 
current outbreak is the EBOV (or Zaire) virus, a 19.0kb 
non-segmented genome encoding 8 proteins, which last 
appeared in DRC in 2008.2 The total estimated case 
fatality rate from 1976 to 2008 is estimated at 79%.2    
 
Spread of the current Ebola strain: 2014  
West Africa 
Ebola is spread in the community through human-
to-human transmission, with infection resulting from 
direct contact (through broken skin or mucous 
membranes) with the blood, secretions, organs or other 
body fluids of infected people, and indirect contact 
through contaminated fomites. Burial ceremonies in 
which mourners have direct contact with the body of the 
deceased person have been reported to play a role in the 
transmission of Ebola.7 
The onset of the latest outbreak which began in 
Guinea, on the West African coast (Figure 1) has been 
traced back to late 2013. Contact tracing has 
successfully identified the index case for the 2014 
outbreak to be a 2-year old child inhabiting the 
Meliandou village in the Gueckedou prefecture of 
Guinea. This child died on the 6th December, 2013. By 
February 2014, it had been transmitted to two other 
locations in Guinea: Macenta and Kissidougou, and by 
March it had spread to 5 other locations in Gueckedou.11 
The first death in Guinea’s capital, Conakry, occurred on 
18th March 2014. The patient was a businessman who 
travelled from Dabola, in central Guinea, having 
allegedly contracted the virus there through contact with 
a visitor from Gueckedou (who later also died from the 
disease). The body of the businessman was taken to 
Watagala, his village of origin, and following this, 4 of 
his siblings, along with 4 mourners at his funeral have 
tested positive for EBOV.12 
Since then, the virus has spread to involve three 
other West African countries: Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Nigeria. Several suspected cases from Mali all tested 
negative for EBOV. Four foci for infection have 
emerged in Liberia, only 1 of which has been explained 
by contact tracing: a woman arriving from Guinea gave 
the disease to her sister in Foya, 24km from the 
outbreak’s main focus in Gueckedou). Her sister then 
travelled to Monrovia, Liberia’s capital city, and 
onwards to visit her husband at the Firestone Rubber 
Plantation Camp northeast of the city. She died on the 
2nd April, 2014.13, 14 
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Table 2: All outbreak and isolated cases of Ebola Viral Disease (1976 to date)10 
Year(s) Country Ebola 
Subtype 
Reported No. of 
human cases 
Reported 
number (%) of 
deaths among 
cases 
 
 
Description 
1976 Zaire (DRC) Ebola 318 280 (88%) Disease spread by close personal contact and use 
of contaminated needles and syringes in 
hospitals/clinics. 
1976 Sudan Sudan 284 151 (53%) Occurred simultaneously with outbreak in Zaire. 
Disease spread mainly through close personal 
contact within hospitals. Many medical care 
personnel infected. 
1976 England Sudan 1 0 Laboratory infection by accidental injury from a 
contaminated needle. 
1977 Zaire (DRC) Ebola 1 1 (100%) Noted retrospectively in village of Tandala. 
1979 Sudan Sudan 34 22 (65%) Recurrent outbreak at the same site as the 1976 
Sudan epidemic. 
1989 USA Reston 0 0 Introduced into quarantine facilities by monkeys 
imported from the Philippines. 
1990 USA Reston 4 (asymptomatic) 0 Introduced into quarantine facilities by monkeys 
imported from the Philippines. Four humans 
seroconverted from asymptomatic infection. 
1989- 
1990 
Philippines Reston 3 (asymptomatic) 0 High mortality among macaques in a primate 
facility responsible for exporting animals in the 
USA. Three workers seroconverted without 
evidence of disease. 
1992 Italy Reston 0 0 Introduced by monkeys imported from the 
Philippines. No humans infected. 
1994 Gabon Ebola 52 31 (60%) Occurred in gold-mining camps deep in the rain 
forest. 
1994 Ivory Coast Tai Forest 1 0 Scientist became ill after autopsy on a wild 
chimpanzee in the Tai Forest. Patient treated in 
Switzerland. 
1995 DRC Ebola 315 250 (81%) Epidemic spread through families and hospitals. 
34
  
 
 
 
Review Article  
 
 
Malta Medical Journal    Volume 26 Issue 03 2014                                                                                                                
 
 
Year(s) Country Ebola 
Subtype 
Reported No. of 
human cases 
Reported 
number (%) of 
deaths among 
cases 
 
 
Description 
1996 Gabon Ebola 37 21 (57%) Chimpanzee found dead in the forest eaten by 
people hunting for food. Nineteen of these 
became ill, and subsequently infected other 
family members. 
1996- 
1997 
Gabon Ebola 60 45 (75%) Index case was a hunter who lived in a forest 
camp. A dead chimpanzee found in the same 
forest at the time was also infected. 
1996 South Africa Ebola 2 1 (50%) Index case was a medical professional who 
travelled from Gabon to South Africa after 
having treated EVD-infected patients. A nurse 
who took care of him became infected and died. 
1996 USA Reston 0 0 Introduced by imported monkeys from the 
Philippines. 
1996 Philippines Reston 0 0 Identified in monkey export facility. No human 
infections. 
1996 Russia Ebola 1 1 (100%) Laboratory contamination. 
2000- 
2001 
Uganda Sudan 425 224 (53%) Spread associated with attending funerals of 
EVD patients, being in contact with patients 
within a family, and providing medical care to 
Ebola patients without using adequate PPE. 
2001- 
2002 
Gabon Ebola 65 53 (82%) Occurred over the border of Gabon and the 
Republic of the Congo. 
2001- 
2002 
Republic of 
Congo 
Ebola 57 43 (75%) Outbreak occurred over the border between 
Gabon and the Republic of the Congo. This was 
the first time that Ebola haemorrhagic fever was 
reported in the Republic of Congo. 
2002- 
2003 
Republic of 
Congo 
Ebola 143 128 (89%) Outbreak occurred in the districts of Mbomo and 
Kéllé in Cuvette Ouest Département. 
2003 Republic of 
Congo 
Ebola 35 29 (83%) Outbreak occurred in Mbomo and Mbandza 
villages located in Mbomo district. 
2004 Sudan Sudan 17 7 (41%) Concurrent with an outbreak of measles in the 
same area 
35
  
 
 
 
Review Article  
 
 
Malta Medical Journal    Volume 26 Issue 03 2014                                                                                                                
 
 
Year(s) Country Ebola 
Subtype 
Reported No. of 
human cases 
Reported 
number (%) of 
deaths among 
cases 
 
 
Description 
2004 Russia Ebola 1 1 (100%) Laboratory contamination 
2007 DRC Ebola 264 187 (71%) Outbreak occurred in Kasai Occidental Province 
2007- 
2008 
Uganda Bundibugyo 149 37 (25%) First reported occurrence of a new strain 
2008 Philippines Reston 6 (asymptomatic) 0 First known occurrence in pigs. Six workers 
from the pig farm and slaughterhouse 
seroconverted 
2008- 
2009 
DRC Ebola 32 15 (47%) Outbreak occurred in the Mweka and Luebo 
health zones of the Kasai Occidental Province 
2011 Uganda Sudan 1 1 (100%) The Ugandan Ministry of Health informed the 
public that a patient with suspected EVD died on 
May 6th, 2011 in the Luwero dietrict, Uganda. 
2012 Uganda Sudan 11 4 (36.4%) Outbreak in the Kibaale district of Uganda 
2012 DRC Bundibugyo 36 13 (36.1%) Outbreak in DRC’s Province Orientale: had no 
epidemiological link with the near 
contemporaneous Ebola outbreak in Uganda. 
2012 Uganda Sudan 6 3 (50%) Outbreak in the Luwero district. The CDC 
assisted the Ministry of Health in the 
epidemiological and diagnostic aspects of the 
outbreak. 
2014 Guinea, 
Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, 
Nigeria, 
Senegal 
Ebola - - Ongoing outbreak.  
Suspected/confirmed case count = 3707; 
Suspected/confirmed deaths = 1848;  
Lab-confirmed cases = 2106. 
 
Sierra Leone registered its first case on the 25th 
May 2014, while in Nigeria 1 patient died of probable 
EVD on the 27th July. This case was never confirmed as 
the courier refused to transport the serological sample 
for testing at WHO Collaborating Centre at the Institut 
Pasteur in Dakar, Senegal. Twenty other cases have been 
reported in Nigeria, with seven subsequent deaths. 
Sixteen cases were confirmed EBOV positive by 
laboratory testing.5 
On the 25th July, Sierra Leone’s top Ebola doctor,  
 
Sheikh Umar Khan, succumbed to the disease, 
highlighting the risk of healthcare workers acquiring 
EVD through contact with Ebola patients. More than 
100 medical workers are estimated to be amongst the 
victims of this outbreak.15 Healthcare workers are at an 
increased risk of contracting EVD, because of prolonged 
contact with infected patients and the associated risk of 
contact with body fluids or infected needles.16 The 
proper use of PPE during contact with such patients is 
essential, and ensuring availability of PPE, as well as 
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training in its use, has been one of the priorities listed by 
WHO in response to the current Ebola outbreak.17 
 
Figure 1: Spread of the 2013-2014 West African Ebola 
Outbreak 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the 29th of August, reports emerged of the first 
case of EVD in Senegal, another West African country 
which borders Guinea. The case is that of a 21-year old 
male from Guinea who arrived in Dakar, Senegal by 
road on the 20th August, and stayed with relatives in the 
outskirts of the city. He developed fever, diarrhoea and 
vomiting and was later diagnosed with EVD.17 
 
Characteristics of the current Ebola outbreak 
Previous Ebola outbreaks tended to occur in rural 
areas, such as remote parts of Uganda and DRC, and 
thus were for the most part self-contained due to 
geographic isolation of cases. The EVD outbreak that is 
ongoing this year, however, marks the first outbreak in a 
densely populated urban area within Conakry’s large 
shanty towns.18 The scale of this outbreak has raised a 
concern on the potential of a pandemic, with 
epidemiological modelling based on the data from 
previous Ebola outbreaks producing a basic reproduction 
number (R0) of 2.7 (95% confidence interval: 1.9-4.1)
19 
meaning that every case of EVD leads to infection in 
another 2.7 individuals, a figure that is comparable to the 
R0 of influenza.
20 
The extent of the current Ebola outbreak is also 
unprecedented. The previous total death toll since 1976 
was estimated to be 1590,15 while, since December 
2013, EVD has already caused at least 1427 deaths.5 
Spread between non-neighbouring African countries by 
travellers, as occurred between Liberia and Nigeria 
demonstrates the ease of spread of Ebola, raising fears of 
its potential for uncontrolled escalation of this 
outbreak.15 
 
Mortality Rate 
In contrast to previous outbreaks, this outbreak has 
an estimated mean case mortality rate of 56%, a sharp 
drop compared to the 90% observed previously.15 This 
discrepancy is most probably due to the smaller scale of 
previous outbreaks with the deaths occurring in the few 
that were infected resulting in a high case fatality rate. 
Data on the number of cases, deaths and lab-confirmed 
cases in the 4 affected countries, as of the 22nd August, 
2014 are shown in table 3.5 
 
Public health measures 
WHO has been following this outbreak since late 
2013, and is continually providing updated infection 
control recommendations as well as aiding their 
implementations in an effort to control this epidemic. It 
has been suggested that the scale of this EVD outbreak, 
as well as the speed with which it has escalated, places 
other countries in West Africa at a significant risk of 
being affected. Kenya and Togo in particular, where 
healthcare infrastructure is poor and appropriate 
facilities for early identification, isolation and treatment 
of cases are lacking, have been identified as being at a 
high-risk.17 WHO recommendations have largely 
focused on the need for the availability and correct use 
of personal protective equipment (PPE), in addition to 
the appropriate management of suspected cases through 
the use of guidelines on diagnosis, isolation of cases and 
contact tracing.15 WHO has also explicitly expressed the 
need for more funds and resources, emphasising that this 
outbreak and its subsequent spread is a result of the poor 
infrastructure and quality of healthcare in the countries 
affected.15 On the 31st July, WHO pledged $100 million 
for this purpose, while the World Bank has added a 
further $200 million. Médecins Sans Frontièrs and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross have both 
shown hope that with more resources and investment, 
the disease can realistically be contained by the end of 
this year.15 
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Table 3: Number of cases and deaths from suspected and laboratory-confirmed EVD until 15th September, 2014.5 
Continuous updates to these figures are available at http://www.afro.who.int 
 
 Guinea Sierra Leone Liberia Nigeria Senegal Total 
Suspected/
confirmed 
cases 
771 1216 1698 21 1 3707 
Suspected/
confirmed 
deaths 
494 476 871 7 0 1848 
Lab-
confirmed 
cases 
579 1107 403 16 1 2106 
 
WHO has provided Interim Infection Control 
Recommendations, published in March 2008 and 
updated in August 2014, for those exposed to cases of 
suspected EVD with a focus on thorough washing of 
contaminated surfaces, detailed medical evaluation and 
follow-up, isolation pending exclusion of Ebola 
infection, and contact tracing.21 A more recent 
document, updated in August 2014, has also been 
published by the UK Department of Health, and makes 
similar basic recommendations to those mentioned by 
WHO.22 WHO also suggests preventive measures for 
avoiding spread of the virus, and recommends that if any 
HCW is within 1m of an affected patient, then a face-
shield or medical mask with goggles, gloves, and a 
clean, non-sterile long-sleeved gown should be worn.21 
The affected countries have taken measures to ensure 
that the spread of the outbreak is controlled, placing 
patrols at the borders, while enforcing quarantine of 
suspected cases as well as proper burial of deceased 
patients.5 Despite this, the increasing sense of panic has 
led to suspected patients escaping from medical facilities 
so as to avoid quarantine, while international news 
agencies have reported that families are leaving the 
bodies of deceased relatives in the street out of fear of 
contracting the disease or of being forced into 
quarantine, instead of waiting for doctors to visit their 
homes and dispose of the bodies appropriately.15  
Countries outside of Africa are also making 
preparations and advising on precautionary measures to 
contain any inadvertently imported cases in order to 
prevent local spread of Ebola. The European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) has issued 
guidelines suggesting measures to prevent exportation of 
cases to other countries and spread within the European 
Union (EU).23 These suggest that, in the event of the 
outbreak reaching a European country, local authorities 
should consider barring known EVD cases, as well as 
their contacts, from leaving the country, for a minimum 
of 21 days following exposure (the incubation period of 
the EBOV).23 The ECDC also suggests that travellers 
from affected areas should be informed about the 
clinical presentation of EVD, the importance of 
revealing their travel history when seeking medical care, 
the need to indicate possible contact with sick 
individuals or wild animals, and the procedures for 
contacting public health authorities for support if 
infection is suspected.23 Recommendations also extend 
to informing healthcare providers about the possibility of 
EVD among returning travellers from affected areas, the 
clinical presentation of the disease, the availability of 
protocols for the ascertainment of possible cases and 
procedures for referral to healthcare facilities, and the 
need for strict implementation of barrier management, 
use of PPE and disinfection procedures when providing 
care to suspected EVD cases.23 The Department of 
Health in the UK has published guidelines on the 
assessment and management of suspected EVD in 
febrile travellers who visited affected countries within 
the prior 21 days.22 The CDC has provided similar 
guidelines for hospital use in the USA, as well as advice 
on infection control procedures designed to prevent in-
hospital spread of viral haemorrhagic fever.5 Based on 
these guidelines, several governments have invested 
heavily in training of hospital staff to follow 
recommendations, as well as to ensure availability of all 
necessary PPE, diagnostic kits, isolation and contact-
tracing facilities, and treatment requisites.22  
 
Treatment  
Currently there is no licensed treatment for EVD. 
Management of affected patients is supportive and 
includes the administration of intravenous resuscitative 
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fluids, maintenance of electrolyte balance, and intensive 
care measures.1 The allegedly successful treatment of 
two US nationals with ZMAPP, an experimental 
treatment consisting of a mixture of three humanised 
monoclonal antibodies against Ebola that is being 
developed by Mapp Biopharmaceuticals, San Diego, 
California and which has not yet been studied in 
humans,24 has fuelled speculation on the effectiveness 
and the need for availability of such treatment. The 
rarity of EVD and VHF in general meant that little 
investment was made to develop preventive or 
therapeutic medicinals. This has led to calls for 
experimental drugs to be opportunistically distributed 
during the current outbreak in the form of a clinical trial, 
in the interest of developing better therapeutic agents.15 
However, there are several issues that need to be 
carefully considered with such a clinical trial, apart from 
the huge associated expense. Traditionally, West African 
populations are suspicious of Western European 
doctors,15 an attitude that will complicate attempts in 
contact tracing, correct burial of deceased cases, and 
isolation of suspected cases and which will hinder the 
use of experimental drugs against Ebola. Questions have 
also been raised over the ethics of testing populations 
within poverty-stricken demographic areas.15 
The FDA however, has previously brought forward 
a 2-animal rule on drug testing, suggesting that, in an 
emergency, a drug that has shown efficacy in two 
different animal models, and that has been proven not to 
have serious side effects in healthy humans can be made 
available on compassionate grounds.25 
Published reports on experimental approaches to 
treat Ebola are limited. Jahrling et al, in separate 
publications in 1996 and 1999, suggested that the use of 
hyperimmune horse anti-Ebola serum is protective in 
animal models.26,27 Maruyama et al, also in 1999, 
reported success with human monoclonal antibodies 
acting against the EBOV surface protein (derived from 
mRNA extracted from bone marrow of survivors of 
EVD).28 A novel approach for extracting 
immunoglobulins from survivors of EVD has reportedly 
been highly successful in animal trials, with results 
expected to be published in the upcoming months.15 
Tekmira Pharmaceuticals in Canada are developing an 
experimental drug called TKM-Ebola which consists of 
small interfering RNAs that target the EBOV and halts 
viral replication by blocking DNA synthesising 
proteins.29 TKM-Ebola had entered Phase I human 
safety clinical trials in January 2014.24 However, the 
FDA halted the trials on the 3rd July, and is requesting 
more information on the proposed mechanism of action 
of TKM-Ebola which is administered according to a 
complicated dosage regimen.15,24 BioCryst 
Pharmaceuticals in North Carolina have adopted a 
similar approach to develop an experimental drug called 
BCX4430, which has allegedly been proven to be 
effective in preventing death from Marburg virus, the 
other member of the Filoviridae family of viruses 
causing VHF, in animal trials.24  
Furthermore, the potential of favipiravir, an 
antiviral agent against Ebola is being investigated with 
Ostereich et al reporting promising results with its use in 
a murine model.30 This drug selectively inhibits the 
RNA-dependent RNA polymerase of the virus, and was 
initially developed and promoted for its role in treating 
influenza.31 
 
Vaccine Prevention 
The development of a vaccine against Ebola has 
been hindered by the lack of interest and investment by 
pharmaceutical companies in researching an infection 
with a previously very low disease burden confined to 
poor developing countries. Dr Anthony Fauci, director 
of America’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases (NIAID) recently announced that phase I 
clinical trials of a promising Ebola vaccine are to be 
initiated in September, hoping for favourable results by 
January and very optimistically to have this vaccine 
manufactured and available for distribution by late 2015. 
The precise components of this proposed vaccine have 
not been published, though a study in 2005 by Geisbert 
et al showed promising results with a vaccine made from 
the Vesicular Stomatitis Virus.32 In this study 
recombinant Vesicular Stomatitis Virus vectors 
expressing homologous filoviral glycoproteins were 
found to partially protect 4 of 5 macaques challenged 
with the Zaire Ebolavirus.32 
 
Conclusion 
The magnitude of this year’s EVD outbreak is 
already much larger than any previous Ebola outbreaks, 
partly due to the very poor infrastructure of healthcare 
systems in affected countries, failure to follow adequate 
barrier precautions, and unavailability of PPE. Cultural 
attitudes such as fear of quarantine, as well as mistrust in 
advice provided by developed countries have hindered 
containment of the current outbreak. Fear and panic have 
resulted in an increased scattering of contacts, making 
contact tracing difficult.   
Still, WHO is optimistic that with proper funding 
and investment, the current outbreak can be controlled 
effectively through the use of simple infection control 
measures, aided by emerging drug therapies and 
possibly vaccination. 
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